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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
, RODNEY K.

STARKS ,

Case No. 16609

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of
' :·!ans laughter, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Mn. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest
F. Baldwin, Jr. , Judge presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, RODNEY K. STARKS, was charged by Information
with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

On

the 27th of June, 1979, the appellant was convicted of Manslaughter,
a lesser included offense.

On July 13, 1979, the appellant was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah
1

State Pris on.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third
Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1978, police officers were

dispatched to the area of 250 West and 3300 South to investigate f
a shooting.

They foi.md Joseph Boykin lying in the middle of

33rd South approximately 400 or more feet down the road from
the parking lot adjacent to the Golden Fleece Bar.

(T .12)

An establishment known as the Touch of Class Massage Parlor

was downstairs from the Golden Fleece Bar, and Kim's Massage
Parlor was around the corner on 3rd West and 3200 South. (T.20)
To develop the circumstances surrounding the shooting,
the prosecution called Kaylene Griggs to the stand.
an

She was

ex-girlfriend of the deceased, and a friend of the appellar.:'

through her employment with him at Kim's Massage Parlor.

(T.28

On the evening of the shooting she had arranged to "perm" the
appellant's hair after her shift as a dancer at the Golden Flee::
Bar.

(T. 27)

She testified that when appellant called her

from downstairs to inform her he was ready to pick her up,
she asked if he would come up and wait by the door because
Joe Boykin had been bothering her in the bar.

(T. 31)

The

appellant came upstairs, and when he and Kavlene proceeded o~
to the car, Joe followed.

(T.34)

Kaylene stated that,
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despite her objections, Joe insisted that she talk with him.
She said Joe also talked about running into a friend who wanted
to borrow his gun, but he said he felt like he was going to
need it.

(T.53)

Meanwhile, Peter Isaacson approached the

three and attempted a friendly conversation, but left shortly
thereafter when he saw that things were tense.

(T.35)

Joe was growing angry with Kaylene's refusal to go with him,
and appellant was trying to calm him down.

When Joe grabbed

Kaylene's arm and pulled his fist back, appellant stepped in
and put his arm up toward him.

(T.35,36)

Kaylene then stooped

down to place her suitcase and drink inside the car, and several
seconds later heard a noise like shots.

(T.37)

She said when

she looked up she saw Joe running in front of the appellant.
(T. 37)

On cross-examination, counsel asked Kaylene if appellant
had ever seen Joe violent, and she answered that he had.
She testified that one evening at the Black Bull with appellant
and Al Cortez present, Joe dragged her outside and beat her up.
(T.43)

Additionally, she had told the appellant about two

experiences she had had with Joe.

The first involved an alleged

"ride" that Kaylene took with Joe which led to Joe's forcing sex
on Kaylene at his house.

(T.46)

The second involved Joe's

dragging Kaylene from a neighbor's house, and the observation
by two men who gave chase that they thought Joe had a gun.

(T.48)
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Peter Isaacson was called by the State and testified
to substantially the same facts as Kaylene.

He said that when

he walked over to say hello, Joe appeared to be angry with him.
and acted as if he wanted to fight.

(T.113)

Peter walked

away when the appellant advised him that it would be better if

he just left, but later looked back to see Joe grabbing Kaylene':
arm and appellant removing it.

He said the appellant and Joe

backed off, with Joe taking the offensive as if he wanted to
fight.

(T .117)

A volley of shots rang out, and both ran, wit:,

Joe in front and the appellant behind.

(T.121)

The testimony

established that the gun used in the shooting belonged to a
female employee of Al Cortez, the appellant's boss.

Al had

taken the gun from his employee for her protection, and then
placed it under the seat of the car that he had loaned appellar.:
on the night of the crime in question.

(T.92)

Dr. Serge Moore testified for the State in order to
establish the nature of the wounds received by the victim and
the cause of death.

He said that there were four gunshot

wounds, but that the one which caused Boykin' s death was the
bullet which entered

the left thigh, and coursed from left

to right injuring the femoral artery.

(T.83)

Dr. Moore

stated that the fatal shot and also the shot to the right wris:
area could only have been inflicted if the victim was facing
· h t 1 y si"d eways.
the assailant, or turned slig

(T.83)

Moorealsc

testified that such conclusion, along with the defendant's eta:·
that the victim had his hand in his pocket, were consistent
with the angles at which the two shots entered the body.
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The appellant took the stand and first testified about
his observations and knowledge of Joe's violent acts.

He

described the incident at the Black Bull, Joe's alleged rape of
Kaylene, and Joe's threats to Kaylene's neighbors as he abducted
her.

(T.166, 174, 177)

Additionally, the appellant stated that

Al Cortez told him on one occasion of Joe's possession of a
gun.

(T.175)

The appellant then related the sequence of events

on the evening of the 29th in substantially the same fashion
as the State's witnesses.

He said that when he arrived to pick

up Kaylene, he noticed Joe's car in the parking lot, and so
armed himself and called her from downstairs.

(T. 180)

When

Kaylene and the appellant walked out of the bar, Joe followed
behind, and the appellant heard him say something about needing
his gun.

(T.183)

The appellant stated that upon reaching the

car, he ushered Kaylene into it as Joe was urging her to come

(T.184)

with him and talk.

When appellant was halfway around

the car, Joe had opened the door and was pulling Kaylene out.

(T.185)

Appellant returned and loosed Kaylene from Joe, all the

while attempting to calm Joe down and denying that Kaylene was
his girl.

(T.86)

When Peter came over, Joe made aggressive

moves toward Peter, whereupon appellant advised Peter to leave.

(T.190)

Peter left, and as Kaylene attempted to get into the

car again, Joe grabbed her arm and drew his fist back in a
position to strike.

(T.191)

Appellant testified that he grabbed

Kaylene's other arm, and when Joe stuck his hand in his pocket
and toldSponsored
appellant
notLaw to
infor digitization
his pocket,
appellant
by the S.J. Quinney
Library.go
Funding
provided by the Institute
of Museum andpanicked
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

and shot at the hand in fear that it held a gun.

(T.193)

He said at first the gun wouldn't shoot, but when he got it
working he shot two to three times at Joe's hand as Joe was
"jumping around".

(T.194)

During this time Joe was positioned

kind of sideways with his right hand in his pocket.

Joe starte

"pedaling backward" and when he reached the sidewalk, appellant

chased him out of the parking lot, firing in his direction ri~
no realization that he had ever hit him.

(T .197)

Joe ran aero

the street, stumbled on the sidewalk and fell, then got up, tor
his shirt off and ran down the middle of the street toward the
railroad tracks.

(T.198)

Shortly thereafter, the appellant

went to Kim's Massage Parlor, threw the gun on the floor, and
walked back outside where he was arrested.

(T.200)

ARGUMEUT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBt~ITTING SECTION 2 (a)
OF INSTRUCTION NO. 22 TO THE JURY WHERE THE
INSTRUCTION WAS UNWARRANTED BY THE FACTS OF THE
CASE.
Appellant argues that he shot the victim in self-defen'
Such a defense was established not only by the state's witnessi
but by the physical evidence.

Both Kaylene Griggs and Peter

Isaacson testified that Joe Boykin attempted to forcefully
abduct Kaylene, and when the appellant tried to protect her,
l"oreover.

Boykin responded with aggressive, fighting actions.

Joe's prior violent acts towards Kay 1 ene, as we 11 a s his alle;
possession of a gun, were known by the appellant.

The

restL~·

·
Dr. Serge M.oore also supported appell 3 ~
of the State ' s witness
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claim of self-defense.

The fatal shot was fired while the

victim was slightly turned and facing the appellant, and while
he had his hand in his pocket.

This was entirely consistent

with the appellant's testimony that he shot at Boykin as he turned
slightly and held his hand in his pocket.

Appellant's right

to defend himself must be judged when the fatal shot was fired,
and the victim's actions at that point clearly indicated the
possession of a gun.

Appellant was justified in shooting for

fear a concealed weapon in the victim's pocket might be used
against him.
The trial court submitted an instruction on self-defense
to the jury, but included an instruction on "aggression" and
"mutual combat" which appellant contends prejudiced him in
his claim of self-defense.

The court charged the jury that

appellant was not justified in using force as allowed under
subsection (1), Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402 (1953 as amended),
if he was the aggressor or
subsection (2) (c).

engaged in combat by agreement under

Those sections provide:

(1) A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person
is justified in using force ~hich is.int7n~ed or
likely to cause death or serious bodily inJury.
only if he reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury . .
to himself or a third person, or to prevent the co1llllU.ssion
of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under
the circumstances specified in paragraph one of this
section if he:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat
by agreement, unless he withdraws from the encounte
a~d :ffectively communicates to such other person r
his ~ntent to do so and the other notwithstanding
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawf 1
force.
u
Appellant contends that the inclusion of subsection (2)(c)
in the Instruction was error as it is inapplicable to the ~c~
of the instant case.
It is axiomatic that the defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed on his theory of the case if there is any
substantial evidence to .iustify giving such an instruction.
See State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, at 743 (Utah 1%7).

And

as a general rule it is not erroneous for the court to instruct
the jury by defining the crime in the language of the statute
if the jury is not confused or misled thereby.
Trial §639, p. 494.

See 53 Am. Jur,

But a charge should not be given unless

the facts in the case justify it.

Since a charge on mutual

combat, or one on aggression and provoking the difficulty, is a
limitation on the right of self-defense, such a charge is
erroneous where it is not supported by the issues and evidence
in the case.

See 41 C.J.S. §378 Homicide, p. 171, and 41 C.JS

§383 Homicide, p. 187.
Thus, in Cullin v. State, 565 P. 2d 445 (Wyo. 1977), whi'.:
an instruction limiting the claim of self-defense (if the jurf
found that the defendant provoked the difficulty or was the
aggressor) was approved, it was declared that it is the court's
obligation initially to determine whether there is evidence
before the jury from which it could infer that the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the aggressor so as to be deprived of the right of self-defense.
If not, the court emphasized, "[t]he instruction cannot be given

as a matter of course in every case involving a claim of celfde fens e. "

Id at 451.

In Cull in the court was justified in

instructing the jury as it did in light of the defendant's threats
to kill, her overpowering jealousy, and her arming herself and
searching out the victim.
Other courts have recognized the same principle and
add that if a statutory instruction does not fit a particular
case, other supplementary instructions must be given to fairly
state a def?ndant's position.
P.2d 597 (Col. 1965).

See Bustamante v. People, 401

Thus, in Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335

(Okla. Cr. 1973), the defendant's conviction of murder with
a firearm was reversed for the trial court's failure, inter
alia, to define "aggressor" in connection with its instruction
on self-defense.

The court charged the jury that it could acquit

the defendant unless he entered into the difficulty voluntarily
or was the aggressor, yet failed to define what constitutes an
"aggressor".

The court concluded that this failure was fatal,

noting that it could only cause confusion in the minds of the
jurors;
It is prejudicial to a defendan~ to give an instr:iction
on the issue of self-defense which tends to describe
him as an aggressor without further definition
of aggression and the aggressive acts that would
deprive him of self-defense. ld at 340.
')imilarly, in Qassett v. State, 587 SW 2d 695 (Tex. 1979) the

court reversed a murder conviction, holding that the evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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...
I

introduced was sufficient to require additional instruction on
the accused's right to carry arms to the scene of the difficul:

1

While evidence supported the trial court's instruction that the
defendant could not claim self-defense if the jury found that
he provoked the difficulty, the court concluded that, under
the facts, the supplemental instruction was necessary to
ameliorate the limitation imposed on the defendant's claim of
self-defense.
Appellant contends that even the inclusion of a supple:
instruction informing the jury of the nature and quality of an; I
acts which would operate to limit his right of self-defense
would not rectify the trial court's error.

He claims he was

not an "aggressor" as defined by the court in State v. Shoenfe'
545 P. 2d 193 (Ut. 1976).

In that case the Utah Supreme Court

concluded that the instructions given by the lower court were
generally in accord with Utah's law, thereby sanctioning the
definition of aggressor as given by the trial judge;
An aggressor is one who willingly and knowingly

initially provokes a combat or does acts of such
a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat.
A person can also be classified as an aggressor
if he leaves the scene of a quarrel, arms
himself and then returns to the scene and renews
the quarrel. Id at 196.
Generally, some of the acts that may ordinarily le~
to combat have been held to be abusive or insulting language,
certain gestures, the making or causing of assault or

atta~,

commission of crime, trespass or resistance to trespass,
criminal intercourse with the wife or daughter of another, ''
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in some instances the carrying of arms.
Homicide, p. 992.

See 40 C.J.S. §119,

Illustrative is the Utah case of State v. Turner,

79 P.2d 46 (1938), wherein the court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to justify an instruction to the jury that
they could find the defendant to be the aggressor.

In that

case an argument developed over the payment of a bill in a
restaurant, and when a customer insulted the owner (the defendant),
the defendant responded, "You goddamn crazy son-of-a-bitch, no
man can come in my place of business and insult me like that."
Id at 48.

The defendant then exited to the kitchen, and returned

first with a knife, and then with a gun.

The court stated that

the quarrel became menacing only when defendant uttered his
threat and took up the knife, and found this evidence sufficient
to justify a jury finding that the defendant was the aggressor.
Similarly, in King

v. State, 232 SE 2d 236 (Ga. 1977),

the defendant urged that there was insufficient evidence to
authorize a charge that a person is not justified in using force
if he initially provokes the use of force against himself.
There defendant's brother had argued with the deceased, and
defendant, though not involved, followed deceased into his
house.

He was unwelcome, and when asked to leave, persisted

in his entrance.

Both deceased and his companion, a woman,

shot at defendant, between his legs and behind him, whereupon
he left.
deceased.

He returned the following day and shot and killed
The court concluded that the instruction given was

?~oper where the defendant armed himself with a shotgun with
Sponsored
by theshooting
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
for digitization provided
of Museum
Library the
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the purpose
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the Funding
deceased,
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deceased with the gun visible, and threatened to shoot the
deceased.
By contrast, in the following cases the courts
refused to limit the defendant's claim of self-defense by an
instruction on aggression where the facts were not supportive
of such a charge.

In State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757 (Wyo. 1938)

the defendant assisted in ejecting one Skogerson from a barroo:
and later encountered him in a cafe.

Testimony indicated tha:

the defendant paused briefly at a booth occupied by Skogerson
and others, and momentarily "glared" at one of the witnesses.
An affray ensued,

the face,
Skogerson.

initiated by Skogerson' s hitting Bristol in

and culminating

eve~tually

in a shot which killed

The trial court instructed the jury that one who '.s

aggressor or provokes a difficulty cannot invoke the right of
self-defense, to which defendant excepted.

Despite the facts

that the defendant armed himself, went where Skogerson was, ar.:
"glared" at someone, the reviewing court disapproved the ins::·;
The court observed that "trivial words or slight provocation,:.
reasonably calculated and probably not designed to bring abou:
immediate fatal encounter, have never been deemed sufficient::
deprive a defendant of his right of self-defense."

Id at 766.

Similarly, in the case of Peon le v. Townes, 218 NW 2C
136 (Mich. 1974), the court found erroneous a self-defense
instruction premised on the assumption that the jury could
reasonably infer that the defendant was the aggressor
Townes case, defendant entered a tire store belonging to c\.,e
deceased, and loudly accused an employee of dating his wife
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When the deceased intervened and asked defendant to leave his
store, defendant refused.

Deceased reappeared shortly

thereafter with a pistol at his side and reordered the defendant
to leave.

Defendant backed out of the store, and from there the

evidence was in conflict as to whether defendant re-entered the
store and shot deceased, or whether deceased made a sudden
movement which caused defendant to shoot in what he believed
to be self-defense.

In any event, the court concluded that the

lower court was unjustified in charging the jury that the defendant
could not claim self-defense if he was found to be an aggressor
in the difficulty.

The trial court erroneously assumed that

if the defendant was at fault in provoking a disturbance in
the tire store, he was then accountable as an aggressor for
any response to his conduct.

The evidence did not support the

inference that defendant's actions were designed to provoke
a difficulty with deceased so that defendant could harm him,
nor was there any indication that deceased intervened with the
intention of protecting his person.

The only reasonable

conclusion that could be drawn, the court observed, was that
deceased sought to protect his property, and a threat to property
is not a legally sufficient provocation to render the defendant
an aggressor.

The court concluded that the erroneous instruction

was clearly prejudicial to the defendant where it could literally
foreclose his claim of self-defense;
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-"[W]hern~ver a judge, by his charge, proposes

to deprive a defendant of his right of
s7lf-defense, he must be enabled to lay
his hand on the facts which justify him in doing
so; and, unless he can, he should abstain from
giving a charge of this character, because, however
groundless the charge may be, corning as it does
fro~ the court! it is c~l~ulated to make the jury
believe that, in the opinion of the judge, there
was evid7nc7 tending to show that appellant brought
on the difficulty for the purpose of slaying his
adversary; and consequently such an instruction, not
authorized by the testimony, is calculated to
injure or impair the rights of the defendant."
McCandless v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 58, 64-65,
57 S.W. 672 (1900).
Appellant contends further that the court's limitation
on his claim of self-defense cannot stand on the theory of
mutual combat in the

abs~nce

of facts to support such a charge.

Generally, mutual combat requires a mutual intent to fight,
which is manifested by acts and conduct of the persons
involved, and circumstances surrounding the combat, including
those leading up to the actual fight itself.
§122 Homicide, p. 997.

See 40 C.J.S.

According to the Utah Supreme Court in

State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, at 742 (1947), "combat" is a f'.;
duel, or struggle for supremacy between at least two persons.
The court further states that "it [combat] savors of not only
the intent to participate' but also the actual participation °:·
both parties.

It cannot be enlarged to include a one-sided

attack on an innocent victim.
constitute a "combat".

The acts of one man can never

Id.

Thus, in the case of Tr-uj illo v. People, 3 72 P. Zd 86
(Col. 1962), the court found that even where defendant and
deceased went to the scene of the homicide to engage in a
in death were not inflicted b:1
fight, the injuries result ;ng
~
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L

defendant during such combat.

Although the altercation began

as a mutual combat, it ended when defendant continued to kick
the deceased after he was knocked to the ground.

Since the

kicks were the cause of death, an instruction on mutual
combat was held to be unwarranted.

Similarly, in Flowers v. State,

247 S.E. 2d 217 (Ga. 1978), the appellant and victim had engaged
in a game of "mercy" whereby each tried to out-grip the other's
hand in a showdown of strength.

The contest evolved into a

fist fight, and culminated in a shotgun blast which killed the
victim.

The court found that there was no evidence showing an

agreement between the men to fight with weapons.

Concluding

that the charge to the jury on mutual combat was reversible
error the court observed; "[t]o charge on mutual combat, when
there is no evidence to support it, effectively cancels the
justification defense."

Id at 218.

There is no evidence in the instant case that the appellant
voluntarily participated in a contest or mutual combat for
purposes other than protection.

There is no manifestation of

agreement or intent to fight; to the contrary, there is every
indication that appellant was attempting to avoid a confrontation
with Joe.

He called Kaylene from downstairs, said nothing to

Joe as he ushered Kaylene out of the bar, and attempted for a
substantial period of time to calm Joe down.

Nor is there

any evidence that the appellant was an aggressor in the incident.
He did not willingly and knowingly provoke a combat, nor did
-c

engage in acts that would ordinarily lead to combat.
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545 P.2d, at 196.

No evidence appeared at trial that appell~:

used abusive or insulting language, that he caused an assault,
that he committed a crime, or that he threatened to kill Joe.
Appellant was carrying a gun, but not for purposes of brandish::.:
it in a threatening manner.

1

He anned himself in anticipation

of a possible attack, and his right to exercise self-defense
was preserved where he did nothing else or nothing wrongful
to provoke or bring on a difficulty.
p. 992.

'

See 40 C. J. S. §119 Homici·'.ei

The conclusion is clear that appellant was not the

aggressor nor did he engage in combat by agreement.

Subsection.I

of Instruction No. 22 is simply not applicable to the facts of
the ins cant case, and the trial court erred in submitting it tc
the jury.
POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO
THE JURY APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION (R.72)
AS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW IN UTAH.
To buttress his claim of self-defense, which was amply
supported by testimony and physical evidence offered by the
State, appellant testified regarding his knowledge of Boykin's
propensity for violence.

He described three instances he had

either witnessed or learned about through Kaylene Griggs.
Kaylene testified for the State and verified the appellant's
·
· d ents.
knowledge of these inci

Appellant contends that since h'.;
1

knowledge of the victim's previous violent acts bears direct1:
on the reasonableness of his action in self-defense, he was
entitled to an instruction to that effect.

He properly exce~:'
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to the trial court's failure to give his proposed Instruction
No.

(R.72) which reads;
INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that all evidence known to
RODNEY K. STARKS, on September 29 1978
concerning the reputation and spe~ific acts of
~iolence and aggressiveness of Joseph L. Boykin
is relevant to your determination of Rodney
K. Starks' state of mind and the reasonableness
of his conduct at the time of this incident.
On the basis of this evidence, considered in
conjunction with the rest of the evidence in this
case, if you find that there is a reasonable
doubt that Rodney K. Starks committed the
offense, then you must find Rodney K. Starks
not guilty.
As a general rule, the defendant, after laying a proper

foundation by evidence tending to show that he committed a
homicide in self-defense, may introduce evidence of the
violent and turbulent character of the deceased.

§3.

See 1 ALR 3d 571,

The reputation of the deceased as a dangerous and turbulent

person is offered for the purpose of determining who was the
aggressor, or for buttressing the reasonableness of the defendant's
apprehension of imminent danger.

See State v. Canedo, 563 P.2d

315 (Ariz. App. 1977). Additionally, specific acts of violence
toward third persons known or observed by the defendant prior
to the homicide may be introduced to show that the decedent
was of a violent and turbulent disposition.

Id.

Specific acts,

unknown by the defendant and directed toward third persons,
as would reflect upon the conduct or motive of the parties at
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the time of the affray are admissable in order to show who
was the aggressor. Id.

And threats actually communicated to

the defendant are admissable to show who was the aggressor anc
to show reasonable apprehension on the part of the defendant.
Id. See also 40 C.J.S.

§272 Homicide, p. 1221, and 40 C.J.S.

§275 Homicide, p. 1230.
Thus, in People v. Flores, a conviction of second degre:
murder was reversed where the trial court refused to admit
testimony that the victim had previously assaulted the defendar.:
brother-in-law with an iron reinforcing bar in the presence
of the defendant.

The court held that such testimony was

admissable in support of the defendant's theory of self-defense
on the issue of the defendant's state of mind at the time of tr.:
stabbing.

And in the Utah case of State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d

340 (1977), while the court held that no error occurred in
excluding evidence of the victim's propensity for violence anc
aggressiveness, it nevertheless recognized the general rule the:
evidence pertaining to the character of the victim can be
admitted where the defendant shows he acted in self-defense.
In the present case, the trial court properly determine:
that evidence of the deceased's specific and violent acts
toward third persons was admissable, and allowed both Kaylene
and appellant to testify regarding snecifi_c incidents of Joe's
violent acts against Kaylene.

Kaylene also testified that

she was frightened of Joe as a result of threats he had
to her and things he had done

to her in the past.
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~de

(T.50)

on:

J

this evidence was admitted, the

a~~ellant

was entitled to an

instruction on it to support his theory of self-defense.
Courts have focussed on why such an instruction

~s

necessary, particularly where evidence in a case is closely
balanced.

In People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1978), the

court held that the trial court erred in refusing to give
defendant's proffered instruction that one who has received
threats against her person by another is justified in acting
more quickly and taking harsher measures for her own protection
than a person who has not received such threats.

The court

explained that while the instructions given by the trial court
did not necessarily exclude the prior threats from the jury's
consideration, nevertheless the instructional reference to "present"
and "imminent" danger might divert the jury's attention from the
previous threats.

Hence, failure to instruct on prior threats

required reversal in view of the closeness of the case and the
conflicting nature of the evidence.
Courts have not given a hypertechnical construction to
the requirement that the trial court instruct as to the victim's
propensity for violence and turbulence.

But they have required

that the substance of the requested instruction be contained
in the instruction actually given.

Thus, in Baldwin v. State,

538 S W. 2d 615 (Tex. 1976) where the defendant seriously
injured the victim by hitting him over the head with a pipe,
che court held there was no error in the trial court's failure
co give Sponsored
the defendant's
specially requested charge on self-defense
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.
based on threats of the victim to kill the defendant.

Instead,

the instruction which was actually given by the trial court,
in substance charging that the jury could consider the
words or conduct of the victim in determining whether the appelt'
acted reasonably, was held to be sufficient.

Similarly, in

Rice v. State, 567 P.2d 525 (Okl. Cr. 1977), where defendant she:
and killed her husband, the court rejected the defendant's
contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give
her proffered instructions that the jury could consider
evidence of the victim's communicated threats and threats to kL
as showing the reasonableness of the defendant's acts.

The

court was of the opinion that the instructions actually
given by the trial court adequately covered the area of law;
"If you believe from the evidence that the defendant
had received information that the deceased had,
prior to the difficulty in which he lost his life,
made threats of a violent nature toward and about the
defendant, then you mah take such fact into considerat::
. . . in determining w ether . . . the defendant
believed her life was in danger." Id at 529-30
(Emphasis Supplied)
The court reached a similar conclusion in Ramsey v. ~
558 P.2d 1179 (Okl. Cr. 1977), finding that the defendant's
proffered instruction which included a paragraph placing undue
emphasis upon the propensity of the victim to be violent was
unnecessary.

The court observed, however, that the instructfo:.
d I
actually given allowed the jury to consider the acts of th0
in determining the defendant's justification in shooting him.
In the instant case, no instruction whatsoever allowed the
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reasonableness of the defendant's behavior.

The trial court

narrowed the jury's focus and allowed them only to consider
whether force Nas necessary to defend against the victim's
imminent use of unlawful force.

As given, the instructions

unduly limited the viability of the claim of self-defense, and
was therefore prejudicial to the

ap~ellant.

A case directly on point and supportive of appellant's
position is State v. Hall, 228 S.E. 2d 637 (N.C. 1976).

In

that case the defendant and one Jamieson engaged in a fight
early in the afternoon, and twenty or thirty minutes later,
while Jamieson was standing on the side of a street talking
with friends, the defendant allegedly drove up and shot him in
the leg with a rifle.

Defendant offered evidence tending to

show that Jamieson often carried a pistol, had been arrested
for possessing two pounds of marijuana and had accused
defendant of telling the police, and had threatened to kill
the defendant.

On redirect examination defendant also testified

that Jamieson told him that he shot at somebody with his pistol.
Defendant assigned as error the trial court's failure to
correlate the evidence indicating that Jamieson was a dangerous
and violent man with defendant's plea of self-defense. The
Court of Appeals agreed, relying on State v. Rwmnage, 185 S.E.
2d 221 (N.C. 1971), that where there is plenary evidence that
deceased was a dangerous and violent man, the trial judge should
charge as to the bearing the deceased's reputation as a violent
~an

might have had on defendant's reasonable apprehension of death

or great
bodily harm at the time of the attack. Thus, it was
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error for the trial court to refuse to correlate, in its
instructions to the jury, the evidence indicating that Jamieson
was a dangerous and violent man.
In State v. Eddington, 386 P.2d 20 (Ariz. 1963), the co;·
recognized the soundness of such a conclusion, but held that
in the absence of any evidence indicating that defendant knew
of the violent character of the victim at the time of the shooL
the court did not err in refusing to give a charge that the ju'
could consider the victim's dangerous and turbulent character.
In the instant case, Rodney Starks was aware of the
victim's propensity for violence.

Both Kaylene and appellant

testified to appellant's knowledge of three particular incidenc
manifesting Joe's turbulent and violent character.

The appella:

was entitled to an instruction that the jury could consider
these incidents as they bore on the reasonableness of his appre'
of the victim at the time of the difficulty.

Failure to so

instruct was prejudicial error.
PE}INT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE
HYPOTHESIS.
Appellant also excepted to the Court's failure to give
an instruction on what is commonly referred to as reasonable
alternative hypothesis (R.52,53, Proposed Insruction No.-'

-22-
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To war7ant you in convicting the defendant,
the evidence must to your minds exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the
guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if
after an entire consideration and comparison
of all the testimony in the case you can
reasonably explain the facts given in evidence
on any reasonable ground other than the guilt
of the defendant, you should acquit him.
Recent Utah cases have clarified the circumstances under
which the defendant is entitled to instruction on reasonable
alternative hypothesis.

In State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019

(1978), this court observed;
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction
that the giving of such an instruction
(reasonable alternative hypothesis) is
neither appropriate nor required unless the
roof of a material issue is based solel
upon circumstantia evi ence.
citing
State v. Fort, 572 P.Zd 1387 (Utah 1977),
State v. Garcia, 335 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960)]
The policy behind instructing the jury on reasonable alternative
hypothesis lies in protecting the rights of the accused.

It

emphasizes to the jury that they must be convinced by the
evidence presented that the defendant is guilty of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
For a public offense to be conrrnitted in the State of
Utah, there must be a joint union of act and intent.

A necessary

element of the criITle of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree, is that the defendant intended to cause the death of
another.

In the instant case, that critical element of guilt

is wholly circumstantial.

The state presented no evidence

which overtly reflected on appellant's intent.

Thus, the

"""idence is subject to alternative conclusions; one, that the
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shooting was perpetrated by the appellant to defend himself,
and two, that the appellant intended to cause the victim's
death with no justification.
In such a situation the proof of the element of intent
can be confusing to the jury.

While the State still has the

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act in self-defense, the jury is likely to cast the
burden on the one claiming the defense.

Thus, if the defendant

fails to prove that it was absolutely necessary for him to
defend himself, the jury is likely to return a verdict of guilt:.·
In effect, the defendant has been forced to assume the burden
of proof.

The alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction

helps to alleviate this confusion by emphasizing to the jury
that they must acquit the defendant if his conduct can be expla'.:
on a ground other than guilt.

It was therefore improper,

under the facts of this case, for the trial court to deny the
giving of such an instruction.
POIN'f IV
THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WAS
DENIED BY THE CUMULATIVE ERROR COl'lMITTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Each of the errors in the preceeding points constitutes
prejudicial error that would require a reversal of the judgmen'.
of the court below.

But these errors must also be considered

to have had a cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial.
The giving of an improper instruction, combined with the
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refusal of the trial court to submit appellant's proffered
instructions, operated to prejudice the appellant in the
presentation of his defense.

Appellant's right to a fair and

impartial trial was irreparably damaged, and for such error
he is entitled to a new trial.

S~ate

v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d

230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955).
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the individual
and cumulative errors stated herein require reversal of the
jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon.

The appellant

asks this court to grant him a new trial in the Third Judicial
District Court.
DATED this _ _ day of June, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

F. JOHN HILL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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